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Abstract—In [1], we present a lightweight online failure pre-
diction approach, called Seer, to predict the manifestation of
failures at runtime, i.e., while the system is running and before
the failures occur, so that preventive and/or protective mea-
sures can proactively be taken to improve software reliability.
One way Seer differs from the other related approaches is that
it collects information from inside program executions, from
which the existing approaches generally refrain themselves
due to the typically excessive runtime overheads incurred.
Seer overcomes this issue by pushing the substantial parts
of the data collection task onto the hardware with the help
of hardware performance counters (HPCs) – CPU resident
counters that record various low level events occurring on
a CPU, such as the number of instructions executed and
the number of branches taken. At a very high level, Seer
operates as follows: functions, called seer functions, that can
reliably distinguish failing executions from passing executions
are determined; these functions are then instrumented in such
a way that after every invocation of a seer function, a binary
prediction (i.e., passing or failing) about the future of the
execution is made; the instrumented system is deployed and
the sequence of predictions made by the seer functions are
analyzed at runtime using fixed-length sliding windows to
predict the manifestation of failures. We have evaluated Seer by
conducting a series of experiments on three software systems
in the presence of both single and multiple defects. At the
lowest level of runtime overheads, Seer predicted the failures
about 54% way through the executions (when the duration
of an execution is measured as the number of function calls
made in the execution) with an F-measure of 0.77 (computed
by giving equal importance to precision and recall) and a
runtime overhead of 1.98%, on average. At the highest level of
prediction accuracies, Seer predicted the failures about 56%
way through the executions with an F-measure of 0.88 and
a runtime overhead of 2.67%, on average. Furthermore, Seer
performed significantly better than the other online failure
prediction approaches used in the empirical studies.
One way we have been extending this line of work is by
combining the low-level internal execution data collected by
HPCs with the high-level external data, which is collected di-
rectly from outside executions, such as the number of processes
and the CPU, memory, and network utilization, to further
improve the quality of predictions. Another avenue we have
been extensively investigating is using HPC-collected data in a
related domain to detect the presence of ongoing side-channel
attacks [2], [3], [4], [5] against software implementations of
cryptographic applications at runtime. One type of attack we
are currently interested in, is the cache-based attacks where a
spy process discovers a secret key processed by a cryptographic
application via creating intentional contentions in a cache
memory with the victim [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13],
[14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21]. One approach that
we have had great success with, monitors the contentions in
shared resources by using HPCs and issues warnings whenever
the extent to which the victim process suffers from these
contentions reaches a suspicious level.
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